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1.   Introduction  
 
Colombia is neither waging war against external enemies, nor has a dictatorial government engaged 
in a large scale repression of insurrection. However, it is possibly the most violent country of the 
world. Homicides are one of harshest forms violence. Unfortunately in Colombia they are 
accompanied by every kind of violence, such as massacres, kidnapping, forced relocation of 
villagers, crimes against property. Drugs traffickers, guerrillas, army and police forces members, 
paramilitary groups, rural rich and poor, young gangs and “self righteous” citizens are all involved 
in violence, in addition to common criminality.  
In the last decade more than 280,000 homicides have been recorded. It is as an entire midsized city 
had been swept away. The rate of homicides has receded very recently as a consequence of the 
policy started by President Uribe, which combines though repression with amnesty to the 
paramilitary forces. It is too early, however, to assume that violence has subsided forever in 
Colombia, although one would greatly wish it. 
Colombia stands out for its singularity among Latin American countries. Although most Latin 
American countries have a reputation of being violent, Colombia surpasses them by far. Its 
homicide rate more than quadrupled between the late 1980’s and the early 1990’s. During this latter 
period Colombia was surpassed only by two countries, Guatemala and El Salvador, both engaged in 
a bloody civil war. But the distance between Colombia and other traditionally violent countries, 
such as Brazil, Mexico and Peru, has never been so wide, as in the 1990’s. 
One would expect that this extreme incidence of violence would impact hugely on the economy and 
democratic institutions. This is not the case, however, at least in comparative terms, especially in 
Latin America. Colombia neither had in the recent decades a revolutionary period, nor a 
dictatorship, of any kind.
1 Its economy has doing comparably well in the region and its  income 
distribution, although  highly skewed in favour of the rich segments of the population, is no more 
unequal than that of neighbouring and more peaceful countries.  
The intensity of violence, combined with the persistence of democratic institutions and the 
reasonably good economic performance, has attracted a huge number of scholars from different 
disciplines – called Violentologists in Colombia – to study the factors originating violence and its 
impact on society.
2 Despite these studies, however, new useful insights might be provided by 
introducing dynamics in analysing violence as an individual behaviour. In fact, it seems natural to 
model the demand for violence using a model which allows linkages of consumption over time. To 
                                                 
1 More precisely, during the Nineteenth century 
2 Gaitan and Montenegro (2000) consider more than seventy studies. Among more recent studies by economists we have to quote 
Bourguignon et al. (2003), Brauer and Gómez-Sorzano (2004). 
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this aim, a number of studies have raised the possibility that the behaviour of agents who consume 
addictive goods could be considered rational, in the sense that it involves forward-looking 
maximization with stable preference (Becker and Murphy, 1988; Becker et al., 1991, 1994; 
Grossman and Chaloupka, 1998, among the others). 
The purpose of this paper is to test whether violence consumption generates addiction in Colombian 
people and, if this is the case, to analyze whether such addiction can be explained in the context of 
rational addiction theory. To this aim, a pooled cross-section and time-series sample of 27 
Colombian departments over the period 1990-1999 has been used. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the main 
features of Colombian violence. Section 3 outlines the basic theoretical model. Descriptive statistics 
of the data are provided in Section 4. Section 5 describes the pooling, panel unit root and 
stationarity tests and the empirical specification. Section 6 outlines the empirical findings by 




2.  Main features of Colombian violence 
This section illustrates the multifaceted phenomenon of violence that challenges most of the 
explanations provided by the literature. These studies assign spread of violence to separated socio-
economic features of the Colombian society. By contrast, our paper provides an alternative 
explanation based on modelling rational behaviour. 
 
2.1. All inclusiveness and overlapping 
Colombia exhibits almost every possible kind of violence.  Violence is associated with drug 
production and trafficking. It is produced by vast scale and country wide guerrilla. Colombia is 
afflicted by pervasive criminality and by violence inside families. Criminal, especially young 
people gangs wage violence in the urban areas. Economic violence is also widespread, particularly 
in the rural areas, where landowners and their private police fight with landless peasants. Oil 
producing areas have become a magnet of every kind of violence.  Reaction to violence produces 
further violence. The most conspicuous example is the violence produced by paramilitary, or self 
defence, groups. These organizations started to protect peasants from guerrillas and drug traffickers 
and have ended up with conducting large scale massacres and extra-judicial killings. Some of these 
groups were started by big landowners and are still used for the protection of their estates.  In the 
urban areas self-defence groups organized by citizens have proliferated and their activity has turned 
from defensive into offensive. Illegal chases of prostitutes, beggars, transvestites are organized by 
groups of citizens. As it has to be expected in such a situation, the presence of the police and of the 
army have been greatly expanded over the territory, but effective control has been lessened. Large 
areas are “controlled” during (part of) the day by the army and the police, but for the rest of the time 
they are left to illegal, violent control. The border between the defence of the legal order and 
outright illegal activity has become blurred. Even racial violence has surged up, although Colombia 
is one of the most ethnically homogenous countries of Latin America. Table 1 shows the number of 






According to statistics common criminality accounts for the largest share of murders (table 2), but 
there is hardly specialization in crime. Guerrillas are increasingly engaged in narco traffic and even 
in common criminality, especially in kidnapping. Initially and officially this was for covering the 
minimum cost of their activity, but there is a large consensus that revenue now extends beyond this 
cost. The same applies to paramilitary and self defence groups. Illegal activities, implying also  
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homicides, are performed by legal uniformed bodies, not to speak of citizens groups involved in 
moral cleansing of the urban areas. 
 
2.2. Growing spatial spread of violence 
Although there is a concentration of violent activities in a few departments – four of them account 
for more than 55 % of national homicides and twelve of them account for 90 percent of the total - 
every area is exposed to violence. During the 1990’s the national average rate of homicides per 
100.000 inhabitants stayed always over 60. Even departments that are considered peaceful, such as 
Chocò and Narino, have a homicide rate well above all Latin American countries (with the 
exception only of Guatemala and Salvador during civil war).  The geography of violence shows 
significant variations over the years. In general, the increase in the overall rate of violence has 
implied and extended geographical coverage of violence. Presently, no department is immune. 
Changes in the localization of narcotrafic, guerrillas and their main adversary, the paramilitaries, 
have set the trend. The drug cartel of Medellin moved to Cali after the death of its (in) famous boss 
Pablo Escobar. This was followed by a significant decrease of the homicide rate in the Department 
of Antioquia, (whose capital city is Medellin). However, the homicide rate continues to stay well  
above the national average, since the Department is now affected by guerrillas  and self defence 
forces that fight to share the rent from coca leaves cultivation, that has replaced drug trafficking. 
Guerrillas and paramilitaries are concentrated in the North Western part of the country, but are 
moving rapidly towards the eastern regions. Coca and poppy cultivation are concentrated in the 
central areas of the country, but while in 1991 only four Departments had coca cultivations, their 
number has extended to twenty-five in the year 2003. Of these twenty five, eleven departments have 
an area of cultivation that extends over more than one thousand hectares (despite the massive efforts 
displayed for eradication). Furthermore, Colombia started in the meantime the cultivation of 
poppies for the production of heroin, of which Colombia has become on of the biggest suppliers to 
the US. At present there is little overlapping between coca leaves and poppies cultivations.  
Violence is said to be an urban phenomenon: Colombian cities account for almost a half of total 
homicides. But this corresponds roughly to the ratio of urban to total population. Violence in 
Colombia is as rural as urban: between 1996 and 1998 there were three hundred and five 
municipalities (over a total of about one thousand) where the homicide rate was above the national 
average.  
There used also to be specialization in crime. Political violence was mostly located in the rural 
areas, while common criminality and that related to narcotraffic took place mostly in the cities. 
These borders are getting blurred, as political violence tends to expand to the rural areas, while that  
  6
related to narco traffic is spreading to the rural areas, where cultivation of coca and poppies takes 
place. 
Clearly, the Colombian state has completely lost control of large areas of the country and has 
surrendered part of its monopoly of coercion to the various criminal groups, even in those areas that 
remain under its nominal control. A violent competition for filling the void left by state institutions 
is taking place among the narcos, the guerrillas, the paramilitaries and the self-defence groups. 
While the important size of these rents – deriving basically from drugs production and trade and 
from control on natural resources, from extortions and offences to property - is feeding war among 
violent factions nobody seems to prevail.  Large and increasing segments of the society are using 
violence to protect and or to advance their interests. Use of violence is spreading from the conflicts 
for the control of traditional illegal activities, to the illegal substitution of state institutions by 
groups of citizens. Even the army and police bodies are in same areas competing, on a private and 
illegal basis, with violent groups for a share of the rents.  
 
2.3. Violence and democracy 
There is a wide perception among scholars that a high level of political violence is “a contributing 
cause to the breakdown (of democratic regimes), but the line between cause and effect is blurred” 
(Linz, 1978). However, the combination of record levels of violence with the maintenance of 
democratic institutions – political leaders at all levels of government are selected through popular 
and regular - is a peculiar feature of the Colombian society that surprises external observers. In the 
view of scholars and international agencies, Colombia oscillates between a democratic and semi 
democratic regime. According to the classification by Mainwaring et al. (2001), Colombia was 
democratic between 1974 and 1990, but fell into the semi democratic category thereafter.  
Recent constitutional reform has tried to increase political participation with a view to reduce 
violence. However, although the positive outcomes of this reform in terms of political competition 
and voter participation, democracy requires that candidates to elections compete fearlessly safely 
and freely. Candidates, however, have become an increasingly frequent target of violence, 
especially since the beginning of this century. Guerrillas murder candidates to demonstrate their 
control of territory and the melting down of state institutions. Their victims are preferably 
candidates of right wing parties. The paramilitary and self defence groups are engaged in the 
physical elimination of left wing candidates, that are considered as actual or potential supporters of 
guerrilla. Kidnapping of candidates and intimidation is also widely used (Garcia and Hoskin, 
2003).
3 
                                                 
3 There are now detailed statistics on the number of political candidates and officials murdered and the numbers are really 
impressive: since the mid-1980’s 4 presidential candidates, 200 judges and investigators, half of the Supreme Court’s Justices, 1200 
police officers, 151 journalists and more than 300,000 Colombians have been murdered (Posada-Carbò, 2004). However, caution has  
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Decentralization has also been used to foster democracy, through popular election of local and 
departmental councils and heads of their executives. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
to be used in the interpretation of these numbers, particularly concerning the trend that they could show. Before 1990 no local 
elections were held, and murderers targeted only candidates to national offices, such as the presidency and the congress. These 
“practices” has continued, for sure.  
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3.  Theoretical framework 
Recourse to violence appears so widespread and permanent in Colombia and extols such a high cost 
on the country, that it suggests that large sectors of the Colombian population may have become 
addicted to violence. In other words, observation of facts concerning violence suggests that 
economic models of addiction could be tested. To this aim, the Becker and Murphy (1988)’s 
rational addiction model has rapidly become one of the standard models in the economic literature 
in part due to its theoretical rigor and in part to its empirical success (Ferguson, 2000). Although a 
great deal of criticism has been recently brought against several assumptions undelying the rational 
addiction theory,
4 the Becker and Murphy’s model is still popular among practitioners, because it 
leads to a simple linear specification with testable hypothesis. 
Following Becker and Murphy’s rational addiction model, consumers maximize a utility function 
which incorporates the addiction that is given by the dependence between the current utility and the 
past consumption of the addictive good. Moreover, since individuals are rational they maximize the 
utility obtained during all their life. To this aim, at any given moment in time, consumers’ utility is 
assumed to be a function of the consumption of a non-addictive good, Y(t), the consumption of the 
addictive good, C(t), and the stock of what the authors call ‘consumption capital’, S(t). The stock 
accumulation process is described by a simple investment function,  ( )( )( ) t S t C t S δ − = & , where  ( ) t S &  
is the rate of change over time in S. Negative addiction is characterized by the fact that the 
consumption capital reduces future utility and earning potential. 
The rational behaviour implies the maximization of the lifetime utility function, subject to the 
lifetime budget constraint and the simple investment function. Assuming a constant price of the 
non-addictive good, treated as numeraire, a concave and time-additive utility function, with a length 
of life equal to T and a constant rate of time preference, σ,  the consumer’s problem can be stated 
as,  
 
() () () []
() () () []
() () () t S t C t S
A dt t C t P t Y U
t s



















            ( 1 )  
 
                                                 
4 A new class of addiction models has been proposed that includes various forms of irrationality,  such as self-control problems 
(Akerlof, 1991; Elster and Skog, 1999), myopic behaviour  (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999; Gruber and Köszegi, 2001); temptation 
(Gul and Pesendorfer, 2006); mistaken bahaviour (Loewenstein, O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2003); and cue-triggered decision 
processes (Bernheim and Rangel, 2004).  
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where  () r − = 1 / 1 β  is the time discount factor; r is the real interest rate, which is assumed to equal 
the rate of time preference; P is the price of the addictive good; and A0  is the present value of 
wealth.  
The rational addiction theory claims that addictive behaviour is characterized by two central 
characteristics, defined in terms of the capital stock: tolerance and reinforcement. Tolerance implies 
that the satisfaction from a given level of consumption is lower when past level is greater ( 0 < S U ); 
reinforcement implies that an increase in past level of consumption increases the marginal utility for 
present consumption ( 0 > CS U ). In summary, consumers inherit a certain degree of addiction S(0) 
at time 0. Individuals then make inter-temporal consumption choices with respect to addictive and 
non-addictive goods which account for forecast effects of usage on future utilities, via addiction 
dynamics, and their inter-temporal budget. Different life experiences, as summarised in the initial 
degree of addiction, drive different rates of addictive consumption even for people with the same 
wealth and preferences.  
In order to empirically testing the rational addictive behaviour, a demand function founded in the 
underlying Becker and Murphy’s model must be specified. A standard technique used in literature 
to derive a structural demand function for consumption of C is to approximate the instantaneous 
utility function in the neighbourhood of steady-state by a quadratic function in the arguments. By 
solving the first-order condition for Y(t) and C(t), a linear difference equation can be derived,   
 
() ( ) ( ) () ( ) ( ), 1 1 1 5 4 3 2 1 + + + + + + − = t e t e t P t C t C t C θ θ θ θ θ          ( 2 )  
 
where  1 2 δθ θ = . The current consumption of the addictive good depends on past consumption, on 
the actual value of future consumption of the addictive good, on current price of it, and on the 
unobservables e(t) and e(t+1) that incorporate the impact on utility of unobserved variables that 
have an influence on the life cycle. 
On the basis of such a function, a test of the significance of the coefficient  1 θ  in equation (2) can be 
used to discriminate between myopic and addictive models, as well as the signs of  1 θ  and  2 θ  can be 
used to check for the rational addiction hypothesis (Sisto and Zanola, 2006). Furthermore, solving 
equation (2) for C(t), one can derive the short-run price elasticity,  s η , and the long-run price 


























           ( 3 )  
where  2 , 1 λ  are the characteristics roots. 
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4.  Sample Data 
Data used in this study is obtained from a wide range of sources covering 27 Colombian 
departments over the period 1990-1999. The variables used in the empirical work are the 
following.
5 
Violence is represented by the rate of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, hom. Past and future 
violence affect the present level of violence, as well as its price. Two different prices have been 
used: inequality and political participation. Concerning inequality, there has been - since the 
seminal paper by Becker (1968) - a lot of research on the determinants of crime and many empirical 
tests of various crime models. The basic idea behind is that criminal acts result from a rational 
decision based on the expected benefits, that are equal to the difference between the loot and the 
opportunity cost of crime. To this aim, there is an intuitively reasonable and generally accepted 
agreement in the literature about the notion that income inequality is a contributing factor to crime 
(Ehrlich, 1973). This is because the more inequality there is, as measured by the Gini coefficient, 
gini, the higher the number of poor people, who can expect to derive a net benefit from crime.  
However, this variable alone does not take account of the full meaning of the opportunity cost of 
violence. In fact, in a somewhat wider interpretation of the Becker’s paradigm, the cost of violence 
may be also interpreted in terms of political participation. It is likely that with more participation 
political institutions work better and deviant behaviour is more effectively sanctioned. Hence, we 
include voter turnout, turn, as a second explanatory variable defining the price of violence. It is 
represented by the share of actual voters on total population in Presidential elections. Due to the 
lack of annual observations, this variable has been estimated, for the years between elections, on the 
basis of a linear evolution.  
To minimize the possible bias from omitted variables on the coefficient associated to our indicator 
of violence, we include a number of controls: the per capita income, gdp; the share of homicides of 
young people (less than 14 years old) over total homicides, young; the amount of extrajudiciary 
killings per 100,000 inhabitants, extra; the amount of property offences per 100,000 inhabitants; 
number of property offences, prop; and population, pop.  
Table 2 presents the mean, standard deviation, and other indicators referred to the primary variables 
in the data set. 
 
[TABLE 2] 
                                                 
5 Appendix provides definitions for the variables of the DANE database that have been used in the empirical implementation.  
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5.  Estimation Techniques 
 
5.1. Pooling 
To test whether data can be pooled, F-tests are performed on the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients for each variable are the same for each year (Levaggi and Zanola, 2003). The results, 
reported in Table 3, show that the null  hypothesis of equal coefficients cannot be always be 
rejected, implying that some caution is necessary in pooling data. In particular, Pesaran and Shin 
(1995) argue that a pooled estimator is potentially inconsistent when the model is dynamic and 
parameter heterogeneity is not taken into account. Hence, to make the model robust to this potential 





5.2. Unit root tests  
We next step test for stationarity of the variables included in the model. To check for the 
stationarity of our data, we employ two panel unit tests, the Im et al. t-bar test (2003, henceforth 
IPS), and the test developed by Handri (2000, henceforth HD). The IPS test is a weighted average 
of the standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, calculated for the time series for each of the 
individual cross-sections. The IPS test assumes that all series are non-stationary under the null 
hypothesis against the alternative of stationarity. Hadri (2000) develops a residual-based Lagrange 
multiplier test for the null that the individual observed series are stationary against the alternative of 
unit root in panel data. Three versions of the Hadri test are allowed, respectively, for homoskedastic 
across the panel, heteroskedastic across units, and serially dependent disturbances using a Newey-
West estimator of the long run variance. Results are shown in Table 4. The IPS results show that the 
null of unit root could not be rejected and hence the series are I(1) processes. On the basis of the 
HD test, almost all versions of the test reject the null of stationarity at 5% for variables.  
 
[TABLE 4] 
5.3. Model specification 
For our empirical implementation we write a variant of equation (2), 
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, , , 9 , 8
, 7 , 6 , 5 , 4 , 3 1 , 2 1 , 1 0 ,
t i t i t i
t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i
pop prop
extra young gdp turn gini viol viol viol
ε α α
α α α α α α α α
+ + +
+ + + + + + + = + −
        (3) 
 
where subscript i and t stand respectively for the department and the period considered and  t i, ε  is 
the error term. The dynamic structure of the model makes the OLS estimator upwards biased and 
inconsistent because of the endogeneity of past and future violence consumption, and also because 
of the possibility of serial correlation of the residuals. Hence, once established that series are non-
stationary, feasible generalized least squares for panel data with correction for AR(1) 
autocorrelation and for heteroskedasticity across panel is asymptotically equivalent to a regression 
in difference, and therefore addresses the possible issue of unit root (Hamilton, 1994). However, 
even this approach does not solve the problem since it fails to control for the endogeneity of lagged 
violence consumption.  
Hence, to get consistent estimates an obvious choice is the first difference transformation of the 
model and the use of the past and future level of violence and prices in  t-2  as instruments for the 
first difference  1 , − ∆ t i c . Due to over-identification, we adopt the generalized method of moments 
(GMM), which has been proved to be an appropriate method to get a consistent estimator when the 
number of instruments is higher than exogenous variables, as is the case here (Hamilton, 1995). The 
GMM estimator has the further advantage that it does not need the restrictive assumption of strictly 
exogeneity of the independent variables since they may be assumed to be predetermined or 
endogenous (Heinesen, 2004).  The overall validity of the instruments is investigated through the 
Hansen J statistic test for over-identification of all instruments. The test fails to reject the null 
assumption of valid instruments: the Hansen J statistic is 1.561, Chi-sq(4) P-val = 0.81570. 
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6.  Discussion 
The results from the GMM analysis are reported in Table 6. As can be see in the first column, all the 
coefficients associated to consumption and prices are individually significant at least at the 10% 
level of significance. 
[TABLE 6] 
The coefficient associated to past violence is negative and statistically significant, providing a 
dependence from the past level of violence such that past changes negatively impact on the present 
level. This may be interpreted as a slowening in the incidence of violence.  Is this slowening high 
enough to guarantee a constant reduction of violence to the pass of time, even if no political strategy 
is followed? A way to answer to this question is to see the coefficient associated to future levels of 
violence. In our sample the coefficient for ct+1 is positive. This implies that consumer does not take 
into account the future consequences of current choice suggesting an addictive behaviour, whereas 
past consumption affects current violence negatively. On the basis of such a result, we cannot 
affirm that our estimates support the rational hypothesis. Rather, violence appears to be a cyclical 
phenomenon. These results suggest the need of an active political strategy to reduce violence. 
Otherwise, due to its cyclical nature violence would inevitably reappear after a temporary 
disappearance. However, the multifaceted origins and manifestations of violence require an equally 
articulated strategy. Our estimates suggest that reduction of inequality and increase of political 
participation are two necessary ingredients of this strategy. 
Inequality and political participation, the prices of violence in our model, are statistically significant 
at all common level and show the expected signs. In particularly, the price of violence in terms of 
inequality (gini) has a positive sign,  showing that increases in inequality will increase the level of 
violence. The second measure of price (turn) displays the expected sign as an increase of 
democracy will reduce the number of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. However, a word of 
caution is necessary due to the potential endogeneity of political participation. The direction of 
causation between violence and political participation is not, a priori, obvious (see also, for the case 
of Colombia, Hoyos and Ceballo, 2004). Political participation is clearly obstructed by violence, 
and intimidation of voters and murder of candidates is a daily feature of Colombian politicy, as 
already mentioned. In their study of 2002 parliamentary election Garcia and Hoskin, (2003) show 
that in the municipalities controlled by the guerrillas, or the paramilitaries, the voter turnout is lower 
than elsewhere. However, their results also show that the same municipalities are characterized by 
higher poverty. It is thus difficult to ascribe lower turnout to violence. They also show that when 
municipalities are affected both by guerrillas and paramilitaries, the level of turnout is not lowered  
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and that in any case the number of voters living in the areas is small. Thus the impact of violence on 
political participation does not appear to be greatly significant. On the other hand, or better to he 
contrary,  the fact that guerrillas, the paramilitaries and other criminal actors try to suppress political 
participation show that fear its impact on them. This adds an argument to the strategy of reducing 
violence though increased political participation is weakly statistically significant, perhaps due to 
the low number of observations.  
As for the other variables, the amount of extrajudiciary killings per 100,000 inhabitants displays a 
positive sign, while the other variables are not statistically significant. 
Based on the results in Table 5, we calculate the short- and long-run price elasticities for both prices 
(inequality and participation). The short run elasticity gives the response in period t to a change in 
the expected price, whereas the long-run elasticity pertains to the response to a change in the 
expected price across all periods (Farrell et al., 1999).  
The short-run elasticities, measured in terms of sample means, are in the range -0.70∼0.86 while the 
long-run elasticities are found between -0.66 and 0.80. Thus, the short-run elasticities exceed the 
long-run elasticties, meaning that in the short-run price changes influence violence much more than 
in the long-run. These results contrast with what predicted by Becker et al. (1991). However, 
smaller long-run price elasticities are typically found in similar studies on addictive goods (Bask, 
2000; Baltagi and Griffin, 2002, Shen and Giles, 2006).  
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7.  Conclusions 
This paper has tested whether violence in Colombia can be explained in the context of rational 
addiction theory. While the previous literature has focused on socio-economic determinants of 
violence, we have suggested an alternative explanation based on modelling rational behaviour. 
According to empirical evidence shown in this paper, the rational addiction hypothesis would not be 
the best explanation for violence in Colombia. On the contrary, violence appears to be a cyclical 
phenomenon.  
An important implication of the empirical evidence is that violence can be somewhat controlled by 
increasing the democratic content of Colombian political system, particularly by fostering political 
participation, and by reducing the huge inequality of income distribution. However, a word of 
caution is necessary due to the macro nature of data and further research is required to investigate 
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1988 2,738  210  273  1,083  16,796 
1989 1,978  137  364  732  20,101 
1990 2,027  217  267  1,229  21,600 
1991 1,829  180  389  1,364  25,110 
1992 2,178  191  505  1,602  25,125 
1993 2,190  144  161  1,097  24,042 
1994 1,668  147  277  1,009  23,543 
1995 1,831  85  371  1,049  22,321 
1996 1,783  183  218  1,131  23,350 
1997 2,318  215  85  1,280  23,200 
1998 n.a.  n.a.  n.a  n.a.  23,096 
1999 1,843  291  158  1,594  24,358 
2000 2,285  440  272  2,276  26,264 
Tota
l 
24,648 2,440  3,340  15,446 298,606 
 
Original Source: Pedro Valenzuela (2001). Original data derived from: Comisión Colombiana de Juristas 
(2000a, 2000b, 1999). For common homicide between 1988-2000, National Police (1999). *With the 
exception of common homicide, it includes data from October 1998 to September 1999. ** With the 
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gini  0.5026812 0.054759
1 
0.36 0.67  PNUD




turn  0.1881315 0.057433
7 
0.093 0.359   





young  1.059866 0.807293
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gini  0.96 (0.4818) 
turn  1.24 (0.2676) 
gdp  2.10* (0.0263) 
young  12.88* (0.0000) 
extra  1.16 (0.3181) 
prop  0.20 (0.8159) 
pop  0.33 (0.9727) 
 Notes: P values in brackets. 
An asterisk in the test for pooling signifies rejection of the null of equal coefficients across years at the 5% level 
of significance.  
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Table 4. Test of the null of the presence of a unit root and of the null of stationarity, 1990-1999 
(27 departments) 
 
Variable  IPS test  HD test (1)  HD test (2)  HD test (3) 
































































Notes: P values in brackets. 
*/**/*** in the IPS test signifies rejection of the null of unit roots at 1, 5, 10 per cent level of significance, 
respectively. 




Table 5. Results, 1990-1999 (27 departments) 
 
Variable  Coef.  Robust Std. Err. 
hom (t-1)  -0.0746527*   0.0151453 
hom (t+1)  0.287148** 0.1282451 
gini  75.69895*** 43.42548 
turn  -166.2705*** 99.40002 
gdp  -0.026511 0.0038135 
young  6.5434* 2.115458 
extra  0.0155172 0.027067 
prop  -0.0017792 0.019887 
pop  -0.000022 0.000027 
cons  -4.597867 5.553407 
N. obs.  135  
Centered 
R2  0.1476   
Hensen J 
stat.  1.561  Chi – sq(4) P-val = 
0.81570 
gini
s η   0.8560   
gini
l η   0.7977   
turn
s η   -0.7036   
turn
l η   -0.6557   
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